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Abstract

On November 7, 1848 William H. Robertson rose early and rushed to the post office in Bedford, a town in
Westchester County, New York. The young lawyer was brimming with excitement because two weeks earlier,
the Whigs in the county?s northern section had nominated him as their candidate for the New York State
Assembly. Only twenty-four years old and a rising legal star, Robertson hoped that holding political office
would launch his nascent career. After casting his ballot at the Bedford Post Office, Robertson paid a visit to
Sheriff James M. Bates, his political manager, to await the election results. Robertson?s intelligence, collected a
week before Election Day, that “news from every part of the district is favorable,” proved accurate. The Whig
attorney heard later that evening that he had defeated his Democratic opponent, with 57% of the vote. To
celebrate, Robertson and Bates feasted on “chickens, turkeys, oysters, and Champaign” before retiring around
midnight at Philer Betts? Hotel. The following afternoon, they boarded the 3:00 PM train from Bedford to the
county seat of White Plains, seventeen miles south. There, the two triumphant Whigs gossiped and caught up
with their counterparts from Westchester?s usually Democratic southern section. Hearing of their friends?
overwhelming victories surprised Robertson, leading him to exclaim, “The Whigs have carried almost
everything!” Indeed, the Whigs had swept every elective office in Westchester County. [excerpt]
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Loose Party Times: The Political Crisis of the 1850s in
Westchester County, New York
Zachary Baum
On November 7, 1848 William H. Robertson rose
early and rushed to the post office in Bedford, a town in
Westchester County, New York. The young lawyer was
brimming with excitement because two weeks earlier, the
Whigs in the county‟s northern section had nominated him as
their candidate for the New York State Assembly. Only
twenty-four years old and a rising legal star, Robertson hoped
that holding political office would launch his nascent career.
After casting his ballot at the Bedford Post Office, Robertson
paid a visit to Sheriff James M. Bates, his political manager, to
await the election results. Robertson‟s intelligence, collected
a week before Election Day, that “news from every part of the
district is favorable,” proved accurate. The Whig attorney
heard later that evening that he had defeated his Democratic
opponent, with 57% of the vote. To celebrate, Robertson and
Bates feasted on “chickens, turkeys, oysters, and Champaign”
before retiring around midnight at Philer Betts‟ Hotel. The
following afternoon, they boarded the 3:00 PM train from
Bedford to the county seat of White Plains, seventeen miles
south. There, the two triumphant Whigs gossiped and caught
up with their counterparts from Westchester‟s usually
Democratic southern section. Hearing of their friends‟
overwhelming victories surprised Robertson, leading him to
exclaim, “The Whigs have carried almost everything!”
Indeed, the Whigs had swept every elective office in
Westchester County.52
The demise of Robertson‟s party a few years later
marked the end of America‟s Second Party System,
characterized by Whig-Democratic competition between 1824
1

William Robertson, “Diary of Judge William H. Robertson,”
Vol. 3, Oct. 31 (first quotation), Nov. 7 (second quotation), 8
(third quotation), 1848, Westchester County Historical
Society, Elmsford, NY. Robertson received with 2,246 votes
(57%). For election results, see Westchester Herald, “Official
Canvass,” Nov. 24, 1848.
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and 1860. Scholars have extensively chronicled how and why
this system rose and fell. Yet historians have overlooked one
important area of the American political landscape: the suburb.
Despite the recent popularity of suburbs as a subject of
twentieth century history, few historians have studied politics
in nineteenth century American suburbs. The most complete
scholarly account of the county‟s history, a 1982 Ph.D
dissertation, is a genealogical study that includes only scant
analysis of voting behavior, political ideology, and party
formation. One political scientist‟s observation, over eighty
years ago, that Westchester County was “the unexplored…area
of American politics,” remains true to this day. Mapping the
collapse of the Second Party System in what is perhaps the
most famous suburb in America sheds light on how the
development of new communities in 1850s New York
enflamed political controversies and why the parties of Andrew
Jackson‟s era became extinct.53
Historians continue to debate the causes of this
political realignment. One prominent thesis is that the
Democrats and Whigs disintegrated because the slavery
extension issue fractured the American electorate along
sectional instead of party lines. Another group of historians
defend the so-called ethno-cultural interpretation, which posits
that nativism, temperance, and religious conflict were the
primary culprits in the death of the Second Party System.
Though Westchesterites, like most other Americans, cared
about slavery extension, it was primarily local ethno-cultural
53

Paul M. Cuncannon, “The Proposed Charters for
Westchester County, New York,” The American Political
Science Review 22, no. 1 (Feb. 1928): 130; Kevin Kruse and
Thomas Sugrue, The New Suburban History (Chicago, 2006);
Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New
American Right (Princeton, 2002); Becky Nicolaides, My Blue
Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of
Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago, 2002); Matthew
Zuckerbraun, “Born to Rule: Aristocracy in New York Politics
After Jackson, a Study of Westchester County, New York
Families in Office, 1840-1910,” (Ph.D diss., Columbia
University, 1982).
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issues that motivated voters to abandon their old parties in
response to the political crises of the early 1850s. But as the
Third Party System took form in the late 1850s, it was slavery
that gave the Democrats and Republicans shape and
substance.54
Westchester is a revealing case study of the Second
Party System because the county enjoyed robust commercial
ties to New York City, the financial capital of the United States
and a central political battleground during the transition to the
Third Party System. The journey from the county seat of White
Plains to the southern tip of Manhattan, the largest market in
the U.S., was only thirty-five miles. With the exception of
New York and Kings Counties, Westchester had the largest
merchant population in the state in the 1850s. As a county that
was only beginning to transition from rural to suburban,
however, the most common occupation for Westchesterites at
the start of that decade remained farming. Though the county
contained only an average population of farmers, the aggregate
value of Westchester‟s farmland in 1850 was the sixth highest
of any county in the United States, and exceeded that of six
entire states. By the end of the decade, Westchester‟s farmland
had appreciated to become the third most valuable of any
county nationally. As the 1850s dawned, the county was a

54

On slavery extension as the impetus for political
realignment, see John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and
Politics in the Antebellum Republic, 2 vols. (New York,
2007); Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men (New
York, 1970); and James L. Huston, Calculating the Value of
the Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the Economic
Origins of the Civil War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003). On the
ethno-cultural interpretation, see Ronald P. Formisano, The
Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827-1861
(Princeton, 1971); William E. Gienapp, Origins of the
Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York, 1987); and Joel H.
Sibley, The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics of American
Politics Before the Civil War (New York, 1985).
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commercial and agricultural powerhouse in both state and
nation.55
These developments turned the county into an
appealing place to call home. Westchester‟s population grew
by 70% during the 1850s, raising it from the forty-third most
populous county in the United States in 1850 to twenty-first
most populous in 1860. Much of this growth was concentrated
in the three towns adjacent to New York City in what is today
the Bronx. One satisfied commuter from Morrisania observed
that by 1850, southern Westchester was a desirable “location as
a place of residence, for persons doing business in the city,
being so easy of access” to midtown and lower Manhattan.
Even twenty miles to the north, a White Plains editor
complained in 1853 that as a result of Westchester‟s
attractiveness to disgruntled New Yorkers, “the city is pouring
out an unbroken tide of population into our midst.” 56
55

Franklin B. Hough, Census of the State of New-York for
1855 (Albany: Charles Van Benthuysen, 1857), 187
(merchants), 313 (farmers); Charles E. Johnson, Proceedings
of the Board of Supervisors of Westchester County (Yonkers,
1860); for national statistics, see University of Virginia
Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, Historical Census
Browser,
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus/
(accessed Nov. 24, 2009).
56
Nicholas McGraw in Westchester Gazette, Sep. 20, 1850
(first quotation); Eastern State Journal, Sep. 23, 1853 (second
quotation); Rohit T. Aggarwala, "The Hudson River Railroad
and the Development of Irvington, New York, 1849-1860"
Hudson Valley Regional Review 10, no. 2, (Sep. 1993): 67;
Evelyn Gonzalez, The Bronx, Columbia History of Urban Life
(New York, 2004), 1-40; Ira Rosenwaike, Population History
of New York City (Syracuse, 1972), 52; Edward K. Spann, The
New Metropolis: New York City, 1840-1857 (New York,
1981), 189-191. In 1850, 58,263 people lived in Westchester.
In 1860, 99,497 people lived in Westchester. For population
statistics, see UVA, Historical Census Browser (accessed
Nov. 24, 2009). See Table 1 in the Appendix for details about
the county newspapers cited in this study.
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Political parties struggled to adapt to Westchester‟s
changing demography over the course of the 1850s. Local
Whigs and Democrats were largely unable to address the new
issues that arose during this turbulent decade. The new
suburbanites were typically affluent Protestants who brought
their anti-Catholic and pro-temperance proclivities with them,
which inextricably altered Westchester‟s political landscape.
Though the Democratic Party remained dominant in
Westchester throughout the 1850s, this new constituency gave
rise to political conflicts that determined election results,
destroyed the Whig Party, divided the Democrats, gave rise to
third parties, and reflected national sentiment on a variety of
salient issues. The major parties‟ failure to address important
policy issues of the early 1850s led the editor of Westchester‟s
most popular Democratic newspaper, the Eastern State
Journal, to observe that “we are indeed upon „loose party
times.‟” But that same editor correctly predicted three years
later, “out of this chaos, [new] parties will take form and
shape.” This chaos engulfed Westchester County, creating
unusual political coalitions and realignments at all levels of
government.57
Perhaps the most notable theme that permeated
Westchester‟s politics during the early 1850s was antipartyism.
This sentiment flourished across the county, but was especially
strong in the southern section that had absorbed most of the
well-to-do migrants from New York City. Cogswell and Hyde
refused to endorse a party ticket during the 1850 national and
state contests, instead instructing southern Westchesterites to
vote “without distinction of party” for a “Union Ticket”
consisting mostly of Democrats and a few Whigs. Even ten
years prior to the Civil War, suburbanites generally felt a
stronger allegiance to country than to party and expressed a
willingness to shed their party ties for the sake of Union. In the
aftermath of the 1850 elections, predicted these editors, “new
parties will be formed, or…the two great parties of this day will
be reorganized.” In the new villages adjacent to the City,
“party spirit has not yet been allowed to interfere with local
affairs…it is no matter whether a Judge, assessor, tax-gatherer,
57

Eastern State Journal, Oct. 31, 1851, June 23, 1854.
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Constable, &c. be Whig or Democrat,” declared the Gazette’s
editors, in 1851. In advance of the April local elections,
Cogswell and Hyde supported candidates “without reference
to…party politics” and encouraged their readers to “break loose
from party trammels, and act an independent party.” The
electoral districts that bordered the City supported a so-called
“Regular Dem. Whig” ticket that included a Democrat as town
supervisor of West Farms and a Whig as town supervisor of
Westchester. Though these two candidates were of different
parties, they both won handily in nearly identical districts with
similar constituencies. The electorate‟s weariness of party
labels revealed that the new residents of Westchester County
had weak local political allegiances years before the slaveryextension crisis challenged the major national parties. 58
Divisions within the parties posed just as much a
threat to the Second Party System as did antipartyism. At the
1850 New York convention in Syracuse, for example, state and
county Whigs divided into two groups: the Silver Grays and the
Sewardites. Silver Grays represented the party‟s conservative
members, also known as Cotton Whigs, who bolted when the
convention delegates incorporated into their platform William
H. Seward‟s anti-slavery policies. This faction derived its name
from the silver-white hair of Frances Granger, one of the
leaders of the bolting faction. Also led by Millard Fillmore,
Silver Grays favored a conciliatory approach to southern
slaveholders, strong temperance laws, and restricting
immigrants and Catholics from civic life. Sewardites, known
pejoratively as “Woolly Heads,” were “Conscience Whigs”
58

Westchester was the name of both a town in the southern
section of the county that is now the south Bronx and the
name of the county itself. On local inter-party cooperation, see
Gonzalez, The Bronx, 39. Quotations in this paragraph are
arranged in chronological order, from Westchester Gazette,
Oct. 18, 1850, Mar. 21, 28, Oct. 31, 1851. For election results,
see Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors of Westchester
County, “Official Canvass,” (Yonkers, 1850); New York
Times, Nov. 7, 1851; and Proceedings of the Board of
Supervisors of Westchester County, “Official Canvass,”
(Yonkers, 1851).
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who opposed the Compromise of 1850, favored restricting the
spread of slavery, and were generally indifferent toward
foreign influence in domestic politics. This faction derived its
name from a prevalent racial slur against blacks because of the
faction‟s anti-slavery political views. Though Sewardites
dominated statewide, the county was evenly split between them
and Silver Grays: each Whig faction had a paper in the county
and half of Westchester‟s delegates joined Granger‟s protest.59
These factions developed in the county along sectional
lines. The Whiggish northern area contained commercial
farmers, businessmen, and industrial interests who embraced
the political views of Seward, Horace Greeley, and Thurlow
Weed. The southern section contained ex-New Yorkers who
hated Catholics, enjoyed commercial relationships with
southern planters, and were generally evangelicals. In addition,
clusters of French Huguenot refugees had long inhabited the
southern Westchester communities of Pelham and New
Rochelle, forming another crucible in which anti-Catholic
sentiment flourished. Though the Silver Grays and Sewardites
were ideologically opposed on slavery, when it came to local
affairs, said a Democratic editor, they “lovingly embrace each
other, and…make no distinctions between their own candidates
of whatever faction.” In the early 1850s, faction leaders horsetraded by splitting local nominations. But as nativism and
slavery destroyed their national and state parties, Westchester
Whigs followed their factional leaders into new political parties
that upended the local and national party systems.60
59

On the Silver Grays, see Thomas J. Curran, “KnowNothings of New York,” (Ph.D diss., Columbia University,
1963), v, 40; Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the
American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of
the Civil War, (New York, 1999), 589; and Lee Warner, “The
Perpetual Crisis of Conservative Whigs: New York‟s Silver
Grays,” New-York Historical Society Quarterly 57 (July
1973): 213-236. On the Sewardites, see Eastern State
Journal, Oct. 11, 1850; Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H.
Luthin, “The Seward-Fillmore Feud and the Crisis of 1850,”
New York History 24 (Apr. 1943): 169.
60
Eastern State Journal, Oct. 8, 1852.
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Divisions within the Democratic Party also influenced
party realignments, though these factional disputes were fueled
by slavery and financial policy. The more radical faction,
called the Barnburners, favored the Wilmot Proviso to exclude
slavery from all new western territories and opposed expanding
the public debt to finance the Erie Canal. This faction derived
its name from a farmer who burned down his barn to drive out
rats. In New York, Barnburners were willing to destroy public
works and the banks that funded them to root out waste and
fraud. Led by Martin Van Buren, the Barnburners bolted from
the Democratic Party in the 1848 presidential election to
support the Free Soil Party—a coalition of Barnburner
Democrats, abolitionists, and supporters of Henry Clay who
fled the Whigs after they nominated Zachary Taylor for
President. The conservatives, known as Hunkers, opposed the
Wilmot Proviso, supported reconciliation with their southern
slaveholding counterparts, and supported the Whig policy of
borrowing money to pay for canal improvements. Members of
this faction were loyal to William L. Marcy, an ex-governor,
senator, and cabinet secretary, and derived their name by
“hunkering” after the spoils of office. Westchester sent a
Hunker, Benjamin Brandreth, to Albany as state senator while
the Democratic Party was split in two.61

61

On the Barnburners, see Peekskill Republican, June 6, 1848;
Herbert D.A. Donovan, The Barnburners: A Study of the
Internal Movements in the Political History of New York State
(New York, 1925), 25, 99. On the Hunkers, see Peekskill
Republican, May 30, 1848; Dale Baum and Dale T. Knobel,
“Anatomy of a Realignment: New York Presidential Politics,
1848-1860,” New York History 61 (Jan. 1984): 70-72;
Donovan, The Barnburners, 9. In 1848, the Hunker ticket in
Westchester County polled 2211 votes (29%), the Barnburner
ticket polled 1378 votes (18%) and the Whig ticket polled
4030 votes (53%). With the Democratic Party split in two,
Taylor coasted to victory in County, State, and Nation. In
1849, Brandreth won election as state senator, with Hunker
support. Westchester Herald, Nov. 24, 1848; Eastern State
Journal, Oct. 26, Nov. 16, 1849.
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Mixed reaction to the Compromise of 1850 within and
between the major parties foreshadowed party fragmentation
and realignment. The parties were in the midst of such a crisis
that a month after the Compromise passed, the Democratic
press predicted, in November 1850, that “the two old
parties…will entirely break up before the next Presidential
election” in 1852. Sutherland‟s prediction was incorrect, but
his forecast had some convincing evidence: a Silver Gray Whig
President had signed the legislation, which passed Congress
with the support of Democrats whose views aligned with the
Hunkers; Sewardite Whigs and Free Soil Democrats opposed
the bills. The unusual coalitions that supported and opposed
the Compromise nationally also existed in Westchester. The
Silver Gray and Hunker presses predictably observed that “all
party feelings and party politics seemed merged” after a
meeting of pro-Compromise Westchesterites passed a set of
bipartisan resolutions supporting the controversial Fugitive
Slave Law but repudiating secession. The Sewardites, of
course, decried the Law as “inhuman and revolting,” criticizing
the Compromise for “forcing us back into bondage and
servitude.” Westchester‟s leading Barnburner editor, of course,
also considered this piece of the Omnibus Bill “a most gross
usurpation of power by Congress; a plan, palpable violation of
the Constitution.” Party affiliation, then, was not a reliable
indicator of a voter‟s views on slavery: Hunker Democrats and
Silver Gray Whigs favored compromise with the South,
whereas Barnburner Democrats and Woolly Head Whigs
sought to restrict slavery‟s spread. The evaporation of
differences between local parties when it came to national
policy had grave consequences for the Second American Party
system. “Consensus, not conflict,” according to one historian,
destroyed the Jacksonian parties. Without clear differences
between Whig and Democratic policies, voters shed their old
political affiliations.62

62

Hudson River Chronicle, Feb. 5, 1851; Peekskill
Republican, Mar. 4, 1851; Eastern State Journal, May 24,
Nov. 8, 1850; Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the
1850s (New York, 1983), 13.
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The other major source of disagreement between the
Barnburner and Hunker Democrats, and Silver Grays and
Sewardite Whigs, concerned how to finance Erie Canal
improvements. In the age of Andrew Jackson, the parties split
cleanly on this issue: Democrats resisted government
sponsorship of internal improvements, whereas Whigs favored
them. But according to one historian, in the 1850 and 1851
statewide contests the canal question surpassed even slavery as
a divisive force in the extant party system. The unusual
alignment of the parties on this question, with the conservative
factions proposing to use projected toll revenues as collateral
for a loan and the radical factions proposing a direct tax on
canal shipments, confirmed Sutherland‟s view that “the Canal
question is…above party.” Westchester became embroiled in
this controversy when its state senator, Hunker Benjamin
Brandreth, broke with the state party over canal funding. After
Whigs forced a vote on a bill to borrow $9 million to finance
improvements, twelve Democratic senators walked out of the
chamber. The state senate became paralyzed as it lacked the
necessary three-fifths attendance required for a quorum.
Though Brandreth did not support the bill, he was one of two
Democratic senators who remained in the chamber to vote nay.
“It appeared to me contrary to the spirit of Republicanism,”
Brandreth observed in October 1851, to block a vote. Few
Westchester Democrats supported Brandreth‟s decision, or
shared his fear that the bolters would further weaken their
already divided party at the polls.63
This clash between Brandreth and his party leadership
reflected how local concerns accelerated the crumbling of the
Second Party System. Westchester‟s Barnburner press, which
opposed Brandreth because he was a Hunker, “wanted no new
63

Ronald E. Shaw, Erie Water West: A History of the Erie
Canal, 1792-1854 (Lexington, KY, 1990) 361-368; De Alva
Stanwood Alexander, A Political History of the State of New
York, 3 vols. (New York, 1906), 2:163; Journal of the Senate
of the State of New-York at their Seventy-Fourth Session
(Albany, 1851), 603-607; Eastern State Journal, May 16,
1851; Benjamin Brandreth to Cogswell and Hyde, Oct. 25,
1851 in Westchester Gazette, Oct. 31, 1851.
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issue….the party would probably be better off if the contending
leaders of both the late sections of the party were overthrown.”
The Hunker press, which generally supported the senator,
endorsed the bolting senators and correctly pointed out that
“the Democracy do not appear to be united in this
movement…with such disunion in the Democratic ranks,” there
was no such thing as a “majority opinion of the Democracy of
this county.” Brandreth‟s decision to buck the state party
reveals that even the most prominent Westchester politician
shared his constituents‟ antiparty sentiment. Brandreth paid a
steep cost for contravening his leadership: the party denied him
re-nomination in 1851, and he was trounced at the polls
running as an independent candidate. The near unanimous
condemnation of the bolting Democrats, coupled with editors‟
rhetorical support for ousting party leaders, would remain a
driving force behind the demise of the Second Party System in
Westchester.64
If political affiliation did not reflect voters‟ views on
extending slavery and expanding the Erie Canal, party ties were
an even more unlikely indicator of Westchester politicians‟
views on temperance. Former Whigs in Cortlandt, a town on
the county‟s northern border, believed that curtailing
drunkenness represented “a crisis in which the principles of the
two leading parties are not involved.” These temperance
advocates encouraged fellow Westchesterites, during the local
elections in spring 1851, to support an independent slate of
anti-liquor politicians “without reference to creed or party.”
The temperance ticket posed such a threat to the major parties
that Thomas A. Whitney, the Democratic candidate for
Cortlandt Town Supervisor, withdrew two weeks before the
race and supported his Whig opponent. Most of these local
contests in the twenty-two municipalities across the county,
according to Sutherland, were “waged on other than party
grounds…the issue was rum or no rum.” The orientation of
Westchester‟s electorate as either pro-temperance or antitemperance, instead of Democratic or Whig, indicated that the
64

Eastern State Journal, Apr. 25, 1851 (first quotation);
Westchester Gazette, May 9, 27, 1851; Westchester Herald,
May 20, 1851 (second quotation).
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process of party realignment was not solely connected to
national debates about slavery. Rather, the breaking up of the
Second Party System was deeply rooted in local affairs that
affected daily life, and was catalyzed when the two major
parties failed to address ethno-cultural issues plaguing northern
communities. According to a Hunker editor, Westchester voted
“without regard to strict party lines” in 1851.65
In the southern section of the county as well, the
prevalence of ethno-cultural issues led commuters to drift from
their old parties. During the 1852 election, hundreds of West
Farms Protestants coalesced around an antiparty prohibitionist
ticket. Though this slate was narrowly defeated, the Eastern
State Journal observed, “the contest was not a party one; it was
between the…Maine Liquor Law [Temperance] advocates on
the one side and the opponents of the Law on the other.” Many
of these commuters, like their northern counterparts, held
stronger allegiances to the temperance movement than they did
to political parties. “It is a glorious thing that party ties begin
to hang loosely on the people, and that considerations other
than party interests are beginning to…call out the votes of our
citizens,” reported an anonymous temperance advocate in the
Peekskill Republican. He wanted elected officials to close
taverns on Sundays, create strict requirements for obtaining a
liquor license, and require any establishment that served
alcohol to also provide housing. Neither the Democrats nor the
Whigs incorporated these demands into their platforms, causing
many voters to flee from their ranks, weakening their own

65

Many Friends of Temperance, Peekskill to William
Richards, Mar. 29, 1851 in Peekskill Republican, Apr. 1
(second quotation), 15 (first quotation), 1851; Eastern State
Journal, Apr. 18, 1851 (third quotation); Westchester Herald,
Apr. 8, 1851, Mar. 9, 1852 (fourth quotation); Mark VossHubbard, Beyond Party: Cultures of Antipartisanship in
Northern Politics before the Civil War (Baltimore, 2002), 9395.
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electoral strength, and foreshadowing the rise of new parties
that did address issues about which commuters cared.66
The salience of the temperance issue, and the Whigs‟
inability to address it, accelerated the party‟s disintegration. In
the 1852 election, the Westchester County Temperance
Alliance held a convention to nominate candidates for
statewide office. The first ballot for state assemblyman of the
county‟s northern district was evenly divided between John
Collett, a Whig, and George Mason, a Democrat. Collett
ultimately won the Alliance nomination and spoiled the
election for the Whig candidate: though the Whigs typically
won this seat comfortably, they lost to the Democrats by 39
votes out of 4,266. “If the Whigs had nominated a Maine Law
Candidate in this District…he would have been elected,”
lamented J.J. Chambers, the Sewardite editor of the Peekskill
Republican, a few days after the election. Comparing the split
between the Whig and Temperance Parties to “a big Railroad
accident,” a Silver Gray likewise observed in the Hudson River
Chronicle that Whigs who defected to the Alliance “find
themselves and the Temperance cause crushed…[Collett] will
feel that he has injured his own party.” By 1852, temperance
movements had siphoned thousands of voters from the Whig
Party, which was well on its way to extinction.67
The debate over temperance intensified in the spring
of 1853 when Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour vetoed a
prohibitory liquor law. In response, the antiparty County
Temperance Alliance passed resolutions to consider
nominating any Democrat or Whig for state office who
supported the Maine Law. Though Horace Greeley was the
group‟s choice for state senate, he declined the nomination.
The convention instead selected William Robertson, the Whig
attorney from Bedford, as their candidate. Robertson‟s original
party was still reeling from its 1852 defeat, and so to avoid past
66

Westchester Gazette, Oct. 4, 11, 1850; Eastern State
Journal, Apr. 2, 1852; New York Atlas, Apr. 6, 1852 (election
result); Peekskill Republican, Apr. 22, 1851 (third quotation).
67
Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, “Official
Canvass,” 1852; Peekskill Republican, Nov. 9, 1852; Hudson
River Chronicle, Nov. 9, 1852.
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mistakes, the Whigs also nominated him. Perhaps party leaders
were swayed to support the temperance candidate upon hearing
Samuel Wood, a powerful Alliance organizer, declare that “it
were better…that existing political parties were annihilated,
than that the evils [of liquor] we complain of should be
perpetuated.” County Whigs had no choice but to take Wood
seriously and cooperate with his anti-liquor party. This
marriage proved fruitful: on Election Day, the fusion ticket
picked up both a state senate seat and an assembly seat from
the Democrats. Reflecting on the temperance organization‟s
recent victory, one of Wood‟s colleagues, D.D. McLaughlin,
boasted that they “held the balance of power, and could thus by
firm and united action control any election.” Westchester
Whigs‟ experience with the temperance movement was a
microcosm of a national trend that intensified in 1853 and left
their party feeble and fragmented. Across the north and midAtlantic, voters expressed anti-liquor sentiment not through
their traditional parties, but through state and local temperance
organizations. By contributing to the destruction of the Whig
Party, the Maine Law movement turned the 1850s into an era
of realignment.68
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Eastern State Journal, Nov. 12, 1852; Peekskill Republican,
Sep. 27, Oct. 18, 25, Nov. 15, 1853; Samuel Wood, President
of the Tarrytown Temperance Alliance, “Address of the
Tarrytown Temperance Alliance to the Voters of that Town,”
in Eastern State Journal, Oct. 28, 1853; D.D. Tompkins
McLaughlin, “Report of the Westchester County Temperance
Alliance,” in Peekskill Republican, Feb. 28, 1854; Tyler
Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern KnowNothings and the Politics of the 1850s, (New York, 1992), 17;
Clifford Griffin, Their Brothers’ Keepers: Moral Stewardship
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Westchester‟s Democratic Party pounced on the
fusion of Whigs and the Temperance Alliance in a desperate
attempt to woo anti-liquor Democrats back into the party‟s
fold. Attrition from the Democrats began in 1852 when
temperance forces came close to installing one of their own as
Democratic candidate for state assembly in Westchester‟s
northern district. With the prohibitionist threat to Democratic
Party strength fresh in mind, the Eastern State Journal noted
the “divided and confused condition of the Democratic party on
the one side, and the rotten, crumbling state of the Whig party
on the other, together with the „loose party times‟ prevalent in
every quarter” of the county. These three phenomena,
continued the editorial, “gave to the Maine Law organization,
or „Alliance,‟ a potency and effectiveness at the [1853] election
just passed, which no clear-sighted sagacious politician could
have failed to foresee.” The county‟s other Democratic paper,
the Westchester Herald, endorsed the Maine Law a month
before that election. Ambivalent Democrats now had political
cover to vote the Temperance ticket, confirming the Eastern
State Journal’s fears. By providing a political vehicle for antiliquor advocates, the temperance party enticed voters to
abandon the Democrats, and, of course, the Whigs. Flight from
the major parties, in turn, led to the unraveling of the
institutions that sustained the Second Party System.69
As the relative stability ushered in by the Compromise
of 1850 gave way to turbulence by the end of the 1853, yet
another split emerged in the Democratic Party that facilitated
political realignment. Many Barnburners found themselves
without a major party affiliation after the disappearance of the
anti-slavery Free Soil Party in 1849. Westchester Hunkers,
however, needed Barnburner votes in advance of the 1852
Presidential contest. But many Hunkers believed so strongly in
supporting Southern slavery policy that they refused to
reconcile their differences with the Barnburners. This dispute
cut a deep divide within the Hunker camp between Softs, who
America,” Journal of the Early Republic 29 (Winter 2009):
645; Voss-Hubbard, Beyond Party, 52, 100.
69
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would welcome Barnburner bolters back into the party, and the
Hards, who would penalize them. In 1853, Westchester
Democrats generally supported the Hards because Softs in
Albany had temporarily fused with the Whigs in support of
temperance candidates. A week after this unusual coalition of
Softs and Whigs won a few state and local offices, the county‟s
Hard press decried “these traitors to the cause of Democracy,”
who “have led off a portion of the honest masses from us, and
defeated our candidates.” Stung losing by an important state
senate seat, Westchester‟s leading Barnburner, Edmund
Sutherland, attributed his party‟s 1853 statewide defeat to “the
Temperance Alliance…but Free Soil treachery and bolting did
more.” The division between the Hards and Softs continued to
plague Westchester Democrats throughout the mid-1850s,
ultimately contributing to the party‟s only two electoral losses
in the county during that decade.70
The tumult of 1853 intensified the following year
when Stephen Douglas‟s Kansas-Nebraska Act pushed slavery
to the forefront of national, state, and local politics. In
Westchester, both Democrats and Whigs sought to exploit antiNebraska sentiment to win elections. The Sewardite press
made the most vocal appeal to anti-slavery advocates by
decrying the bill‟s passage as “the darkest day in the Senate”
and promising “political death to every man who lifted his hand
or voice in favor of slavery.” The largest of many antiNebraska meetings in the county took place at the White Plains
Courthouse in August 1854, and featured speeches by
politicians from both parties. The county‟s Barnburner organ,
the Eastern State Journal, also commended Westchester‟s
Democratic Congressman, Jared V. Peck, for voting against the
Kansas-Nebraska Act. Sewardites and Barnburners united in
opposition. Westchester‟s Hards, however, split. Most
prominent among them, State Senator Benjamin Brandreth
encouraged his supporters to remain “true to [their] northern
instincts and experience” by opposing the Kansas-Nebraska
70
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Act. But Caleb Roscoe, the editor of the Westchester Herald,
supported Douglas‟s bill because it established the doctrine of
popular sovereignty, or local referenda on whether or not to
permit slavery in the territories. Despite this minor division
within an already factionalized Democratic Party, anti-slavery
sentiment generally united Westchesterites. Whereas reaction
to the Compromise of 1850 was mixed, reaction to the KansasNebraska Act was nearly unanimous. So although slavery
became a salient national issue, fault lines between the local
parties formed based on ethno-cultural distinctions. In the
1854 contest, nativism and temperance did more than slavery to
upend Westchester‟s party system. 71
Across the North, voters expressed nativist sentiment
through a third party called the Know-Nothings. The rank-andfile often belonged to secret fraternal lodges affiliated with the
Order of United Americans (O.U.A.) or the Order of the Star
Spangled Banner (O.S.S.B). According to a county KnowNothing, these lodges consisted mostly of former Hunkers and
Silver Grays, who coalesced around a conservative political
agenda of prohibiting alcohol, creating tough naturalization
laws, and limiting Catholic influence in public institutions. In
the southern towns of West Farms, Pelham, and Westchester,
anti-Catholic, anti-liquor, and antiparty sentiment had
flourished since at least 1850, providing a rich pool of voters
for the Know-Nothings. “They seem, down in the lower part of
the County, to deal in Native Americanism,” charged a
Peekskill Whig who lived on Westchester‟s northern border.
This sentiment was, in reality, ubiquitous in the anti-Catholic
and temperance enclaves along Westchester‟s New York City
border. Commuters who fled the City, in part to avoid Irish
immigrants, found a home in the Know-Nothing Party.
Likewise, the Huguenot Protestants, who fled persecution from
a French Catholic monarchy to settle in Pelham and New
71
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Rochelle, also flocked to the Know-Nothings. Many voters in
West Farms, according to a Peekskill Republican correspondent
feared the “foreign and antagonistic population” a few miles
south, whose “noisy and riotous proceedings” disturbed
otherwise tranquil country lives. By providing a vehicle to
elevate the ethno-cultural issues that neither the Democrats nor
the Whigs adequately addressed, the Know-Nothings weakened
these two factionalized parties and dominated Westchester
politics in 1854 and 1855.72
Though Know-Nothingism thrived in Westchester,
some lodges suffered from factional rivalries. These divisions
stemmed primarily from previous party affiliations and
prevented the Order from establishing itself as a potent political
force as the Third Party System took form. “I have tried for the
last six or eight meetings to procure an acceptance and
indorsement of this ticket,” complained an Ossining KnowNothing to party leader and 1854 gubernatorial candidate
Daniel Ullmann. A week before the election, Know-Nothing
cohesion appeared to be unraveling in that town because “two
thirds of this council will vote directly for Seymour, and the
Whig members insist that a State nomination by our Order is
intended to entice the Whig members to throw away their votes
on our nominee.” This worst-case scenario became a reality
when Ullmann was routed in Ossining, with the Soft candidate
and the Whig candidate receiving a combined 80% of the vote.
An Ossining Democrat mocked this lodge, in an Eastern State
Journal column, as being “led by a set of old party hacks and
broken down politicians who have managed to crawl into their
Order.” Alexander H. Wells, the leader of O.S.S.B Chapter
#72 in Ossining, conceded that his fellow nativists would most
72
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likely vote “with their previous party predilections.” Though
his concern proved valid for his lodge, most others around the
county supported Ullmann. O.S.S B members shed their old
party ties and united with previous political rivals to vote the
Know-Nothing ticket in the fall of 1854. J.P. Sanders, a
Peekskill Know-Nothing who assured Ullmann that
“everything is smooth in this section,” better measured the
Westchester electorate‟s pulse than did his Ossining
counterpart.73
Both parties feared the Order as the 1854 elections
approached. “Every vote given to Ullmann [Know-Nothing]
will be taken from Clark [Whig] and practically given to
Seymour [Democrat], the Rum candidate and advocate of
slavery propagandism. Why then should any Whig or
Temperance man…worse than waste his vote, by casting it for
this altogether useless nomination?” inquired the county‟s
Whig organ in advance of the gubernatorial election. Though
Clark narrowly edged Seymour to capture the governorship,
Ullmann likely siphoned hundreds of Westchester voters from
his Whig opponent, almost leading to a Democratic victory. 74
But the Democrats surprisingly had more to fear from the rise
of the nativist party. As the election returns demonstrate, from
1853 to 1854, Democrats‟ share of the vote was slashed by
25%, whereas the Whig share of the vote declined by 13%,
which equaled the Know-Nothings‟ 38%. “From the number
of Know Nothings, it will be a task of much difficulty to elect a
Democrat from Westchester to Congress,” Eastern State
Journal editor Edmund Sutherland predicted, after observing
large defections from his party. His fears were valid. At the
1854 canvass, the Know-Nothing ticket polled pluralities in a
majority of Westchester municipalities. Westchester‟s
73
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Congressman, Bayard Clarke, was now a loyal member of the
Order, as were most countywide officials.75
By 1854, party lines had become dismantled and
traditional political apparatuses were rendered impotent. “A
perfect whirlwind seems to have passed over the county,
rooting up and tearing down all previous political calculations,
electing those in many instances least expecting to be elected,”
wrote Sutherland. This editor astutely observed that “from out
of the political chaos” of divided Whigs and Democrats, “the
Nativist element, with its secret and close organization called
„Know Nothing,‟ sprung up, absorbing materials of every
description of opinion and character.” Westchester Whigs
boasted that the Democratic Party had become “a house
divided against itself” because temperance and slavery
overshadowed party lines. Adding the secret political
organization of Know-Nothings into this political stew even
further clouded the electoral landscape. The large number of
parties, and the myriad of diverse issues at stake, represented
that the stability created by two-party competition during the
Second Party System had given way to chaos by the mid1850s. After the 1854 election, yet another threat to the
Jacksonian political system emerged in the form of a new
party.76
As anti-slavery sentiment intensified, it cleaved
existing fissures in the Whig Party and led to its complete
disintegration. The major turning point came in May 1854,
75

In 1854, Know-Nothings enjoyed the greatest success at the
polls in Massachusetts, followed by New York. Within the
state, Westchester County contained a disproportionate
amount of Know-Nothings. According to a County KnowNothing, reported the Peekskill Republican on Oct. 17, 1854,
“the City of New York and its immediate vicinity held
control” at the state Know-Nothing Convention, with
Westchester County alone furnishing more than 10% of the
delegates. For Sutherland‟s analysis, see Eastern State
Journal, Oct. 13, 1854. For election results, see Table 2 in the
Appendix; New York Times, Nov. 18, 1853 and Dec. 21, 1854.
76
Eastern State Journal, Nov. 10, 1854; Peekskill Republican,
Oct. 31, 1854.

46

when Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act along
sectional, instead of party, lines. Sewardites, Barnburners, and
a few Softs who also opposed the act, joined with anti-liquor
politicos to found the Westchester Republican Party in 1855.
“Let all party differences be thrown to the winds,” proclaimed
a Whig-turned-Republican editor, who welcomed anyone
“whether hitherto known as a Democrat or Whig.” Meeting at
the spot in White Plains where the Provincial Congress of New
York had received the Declaration of Independence, the men at
the first County Republican Convention “disregarded their
former party associations by uniting” on a platform dominated
by anti-slavery policy. Specifically, Westchester Republicans
repudiated the influence of the Slave Power, opposed repeal of
the Missouri Compromise, and decried the fighting between
pro- and anti-slavery forces in the Kansas territory. Like the
handful of other northern suburban counties around New York
City, Boston, and Philadelphia, Westchester embraced a
moderate brand of Republicanism. The federal government
lacked the authority to meddle in states‟ affairs, the
Westchester platform contended, and thus could not abolish
slavery in the states where it already existed. Rather, the
institution should die gradually by excluding slavery from
western territories and rejecting admission of additional slave
states. The local 1855 platform almost exactly mirrored the
first national Republican one in 1856, which one historian
considers the handiwork of the party‟s moderate wing.77
Though free labor dominated Republican ideology,
the party in Westchester also organized to counter KnowNothingism. The county platform contained a unique plank
explicitly “repudiat[ing] the order of Know-Nothings.” Party
leaders considered Know-Nothings more threatening than
Democrats. In the first election the local Republicans
contested, they joined with Democrats to create an Anti-Know77
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Nothing Union County ticket “in opposition to the apostates
and renegades from all parties who have banded themselves
together in an oath-bound secret conspiracy.” Though New
Yorkers could choose from four statewide tickets in 1855, the
Hard Westchester Herald analyzed, “the local contest lies
between the secret unprincipled, and prospective order of
Know Nothings, and the PEOPLE without distinction as to the
former party ties.” The anti-Know-Nothing state senate
candidate, Benjamin Brandreth, published an editorial in
several Westchester papers declaring that, “the contest in this
campaign is not between Democrats and Republicans, but
between patriots and Know-Nothings.” Brandreth‟s appeal to
patriotic principles, in addition to his anti-slavery credentials,
mollified reluctant Republicans loath to support Democrats.
Opposing Know-Nothingism superseded party lines in
Westchester. According to the Eastern State Journal, “the
Whigs are ready to sustain Dr. Brandreth in this contest—not
because he is a Whig, for he is not…but to defeat the KnowNothing[s].”78
Though Westchester Know-Nothings consisted
primarily of ex-Democrats, they nonetheless enthusiastically
supported an ex-Whig for state senator. Their nominee, John
W. Ferdon, typified northern Know-Nothingism by supporting
the Maine Law and opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Act. But
Ferdon appealed to ex-Democrats primarily because he
opposed William H. Seward. As state senator in the 1840s,
Ferdon had supported Ogden Hoffman, a Democrat-turnedWhig, over Seward for U.S. Senate because the nativist
78
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opposed Seward‟s plan to create publicly funded schools for
Catholic children. Schooling again played a critical role in the
1855 election, and was perhaps the clearest policy distinction
between Ferdon and Brandreth. The Democrat had long
supported Seward‟s policy. Brandreth‟s status as an English
immigrant, moreover, enraged county Know-Nothings who
favored extending the naturalization period to twenty-one
years. Such a policy would have forced Brandreth to wait one
more year before earning citizenship, precluding him from
even running for office. Because both candidates opposed the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, national issues were minimized in the
1855 contest. Ethno-cultural issues figured most prominently.
On the one side, an ex-Whig Know-Nothing supported
embraced nativism and temperance. On the other, an exDemocrat “Unionist” rejected them.79
This strategy had mixed results. In the state senate
race, Brandreth narrowly carried Westchester, but in the
district, which also comprised Putnam and Rockland counties,
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing, won by a mere 62 votes out of
11,116 cast. Nevertheless, the anti-Know Nothing ticket won
both assembly seats and a host of local offices. The impressive
Republican showing indicated that the new party united the
political forces that had paralyzed Westchester Whigs. The
opportunity to converge with anti-slavery and temperance men
in a new political party opposed to Democrats and KnowNothings proved attractive to Sewardite Whigs, who shed their
old party label.80 This temporary coalition of Republicans, ex79
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Whigs, and Democrats sufficiently routed Know-Nothings in
local contests for coroner, surrogate, superintendent of the
poor, and county treasurer, among others. Joel T. Headley,
who headed the American ticket as nominee for secretary of
state, polled a plurality in Westchester, and the Know-Nothing
ticket polled pluralities statewide. Still hopelessly divided into
Softs and Hards, the Democratic Party was too crippled to
seriously contend for elective office. In Westchester, the party
system that dominated since Jackson‟s presidency was now
dead.81
The Democrats remained factionalized heading into
the 1856 presidential elections. The party‟s leading organ
attacked party leaders. “Setting aside both factitious
organizations now existing…which divide the ranks and break
down the energies of the party,” Sutherland suggested that the
decades-old organization “start anew.” Such antiparty
expressions a few months prior to the presidential election
seemed to foreshadow a weak performance at the polls. Fierce
inter-party competition in the immediate wake of the Second
Party System‟s collapse also complicated Democratic efforts
on two fronts: dissolving the 1855 fusion with Republicans and
defeating Know-Nothingism. Engulfed by antipartyism,
nativism, and slavery, Westchester became a bloody
battleground during the 1856 presidential campaign. 82
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Westchester Know-Nothings met with mixed
emotions Millard Fillmore‟s 1856 nomination for president on
the American Party ticket. “There is a strong feeling here
favorable to the American candidates,” Alexander Wells and
Abram Hyatt, prominent Ossining Know-Nothings, wrote
Daniel Ullmann. “We have plenty of votes.” Wells and Hyatt
supported Fillmore because they shared Whig antecedents. But
among Democrats who dabbled in Know-Nothingism,
Fillmore‟s nomination was not acceptable. “What Democrat,
who wishes well to his country, can vote for Fillmore?” asked a
Hard who sympathized with the Know-Nothings. “None
surely,” he answered, because a victorious Fillmore would dole
out patronage only to former Whigs. Paralyzed by internal
disputes between ex-Democrats and ex-Whigs, Know-Nothings
became crippled and would never again seriously contend for
elective office.83
If even Westchester Know-Nothings could not fully
shed their old party affiliations, then the American Party lacked
the cohesion required to wage a winning national campaign for
the presidency. Fillmore‟s candidacy confronted ex-Whigs
with a dilemma regarding slavery. As President he had signed
the controversial Compromise of 1850, which precipitated the
New York Whigs‟ split into Sewardites and Silver Grays.
Fillmore had led the conservative faction and still favored
conciliation with southern slave interests, a position which, by
1856, had become anathema to northern voters. Violent
conflicts over whether to allow slavery in the Kansas territory,
which came to a head in the months prior to the campaign,
persuaded anti-slavery Know-Nothings to cast their lot with the
Republican candidate, John Fremont, who ran on a free labor
platform. The election results indeed suggest that voters who
bolted from the Know-Nothings after 1855 migrated almost
entirely into the Republican fold. These mass defections
occurred because nativism was “made secondary to the
83
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question of Slavery,” analyzed an American Party voter.
Amidst this confusion among anti-slavery forces, the
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan, squeezed out a close
victory in county and a landslide in country.84
Little did Buchanan know that Westchesterites
ironically elected a Congressman who would become a sharp
thorn in his side. In 1856, New York‟s Ninth Electoral District,
comprised of Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland counties,
sent Democrat John B. Haskin to Washington. Born in 1821
into a family of New York shipping magnates, Haskin was
raised in Fordham on an estate that is now part of Woodlawn
Cemetery in the Bronx. After studying law, Haskin became
involved in Democratic politics when the political crisis of the
1850s commenced. As a conservative Hunker Democrat, he
resisted agitating the slavery question by refusing to take a
position on the Compromise on 1850 and by supporting the
Baltimore Platform of 1852, which affirmed the local character
of that divisive issue. He also staunchly opposed the Maine
Law and was elected to four consecutive terms as Town
Supervisor of West Farms, beginning in 1850, before the influx
of Protestant immigrants from New York City turned the
southern towns into prohibitionist enclaves. When it came to
state politics, Haskin opposed the $9 million bill to finance Erie
Canal improvements and considered his fellow Democrat,
Benjamin Brandreth, a foe for refusing to bolt the Assembly in
protest. By 1854, national events forced Haskin to take a stand
regarding slavery, so he supported Stephen Douglas‟ KansasNebraska Bill repealing the Missouri Compromise and
endorsing popular sovereignty. Now in Congress, Haskin was
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well positioned to take a pre-eminent role in the national
debates regarding the extension of slavery.85
Though slavery consumed national politics after the
election of 1856, in Westchester ethno-cultural issues remained
pre-eminent. Fillmore‟s poor showing made it clear that
Know-Nothings would soon cease to exist. And with local
elections in April and November 1857 quickly approaching,
Republicans sought to envelop the key swing voting bloc—
American Party voters. First, leaders re-nominated John
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing incumbent, for state senate, even
though the Republican rank-and-file had opposed his candidacy
in 1855. Second, the Republican-controlled state legislature
passed the Metropolitan Police Bill, which unified the police
departments of the City and several downstate counties,
including Westchester. In West Farms, Westchester, Pelham,
and Morrisania, Know-Nothings and Republicans alike
supported the bill based on their preference for law and order.
These areas‟ proximity to the City “exposed [them] to the
attacks of unscrupulous marauders,” most of whom, Rowe
charged, were immigrants. “We have come to resemble the city
in our moral as well as our physical character,” he decried. As
early as 1853, Edward Wells, the county District Attorney,
acknowledged that these southern towns along the Harlem
Railroad were disproportionately plagued by crime committed
by New Yorkers. Ferdon‟s vote in favor of the bill as state
senator encouraged Republicans to believe that nativists would
consider ethno-cultural issues at the ballot box and migrate into
their camp.86
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Democrats, in response, waged a vicious campaign
against Republican positions on the Police Bill, slavery, and
nativism. They vilified Ferdon for voting with the Republicans
to consolidate downstate police forces, which, they warned,
would result in Westchester‟s occupation—similar to the
British occupation of the colonies. To make matters worse,
county taxes would increase. Describing the “Black
Republican Party” as the refuge of aristocratic elites, the
Eastern State Journal charged that, according to party creed,
the government was “the omnipotent source of power, above
the people, instituted to control and manage them.” The
Democratic editor applied this philosophy to both slavery and
temperance. Denying Kansas popular sovereignty would turn
territorial residents into subjects of a monarchy in Washington,
while legislating morality turned government into a guardian
authority. Westchesterites, according to the Sutherland, could
either support Brandreth who thought “poor white people are as
good as Niggers,” or support Ferdon who was allegedly in
favor of black suffrage. As Know-Nothingism waned, the
Democrats and Republicans took opposing positions on a host
of national and local issues. If consensus destroyed the Second
Party System, conflict was fast constructing the Third.87
In the battle for the remnants of Westchester‟s
American Party, the Democrats bested the Republicans. Little
consensus exists on what caused this peculiar realignment. A
Republican blamed his party‟s 1857 defeat on “the general
combination of the American with the Democratic Party.” Low
turnout because of the off-year election compounded the
Republicans‟ woes. Sutherland correctly pointed out that
Democrats who had become Americans would switch back in
1857. Both Sutherland and contemporary historians have
pointed out that these voters had become fed up with the
nativists‟ impasse over slavery. Other historians have stressed
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opposition to the Police Bill as the major 1857 election
determinant. The results for state senate seem to support this
conclusion. Though Ferdon polled better than the Republican
Party generally, he lost even in municipalities bordering New
York City that had the most vested interests in the Police Bill.
By 1857, most residents in these southern towns were migrants
from the City who still held strong allegiances to the
Democratic machine at Tammany Hall, which opposed ceding
control of the police force. Whereas most historians agree that
northern Know-Nothings generally migrated into the
Republican camp, in Westchester it appears that local issues
pushed them in droves towards the Democratic Party.88
Know-Nothings who flocked there would soon
discover that factional divisions regarding slavery once again
plagued their party. After disputes between pro-slavery and
anti-slavery settlers in Kansas erupted in violence, the official
territorial legislature met at Lecompton in 1857. There, they
passed a constitution allowing slavery and put the document to
the territorial inhabitants for an up-or-down vote, which antislavery forces boycotted. Amid this uproar, President
Buchanan endorsed the Lecompton Constitution. Democrats
splintered about whether to follow his lead. Senator Stephen
A. Douglas of Illinois led a faction in opposition to the
administration. They criticized the Lecompton Constitution
because the circumstances surrounding its passage seemed to
contravene the principle of popular sovereignty. Westchester‟s
Congressman, John Haskin, was one of twelve House
Democrats to cast his lot with Douglas, and against Buchanan.
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On a stifling evening in June 1858, Haskin rose to
address a crowd of 250 supporters, who had assembled to renominate him for Congress. The Lecompton Constitution, he
said “would have entailed upon that virgin territory [of Kansas]
the curse of Slavery.” Turning the election of 1858 into a
referendum on this issue alone, Haskin accused Buchanan, his
fellow Democrat, of abandoning the platform upon which he
was elected. Taking cues from Douglas, Haskin argued that the
Administration‟s policy of supporting a fraudulent constitution
denied Kansans the right to exercise democratic control over
local issues. Prominent Westchester Democrats, ex-Whigs,
Republicans, and Know-Nothings agreed with Haskin.
According to Robert H. Coles, an ex-Barnburner Democrat
from New Rochelle who attended the meeting, Haskin
“exposed one of the most…shameful swindles that was ever
perpetuated upon the Government.” Should his opponents
“succeed in disturbing and dividing our party, a wound will be
opened that will bleed more profusely than the wounds of
bleeding Kansas.”89
The partisan Democratic press not only opened these
wounds, they also poured salt into them. “We are perfectly
willing that the Republicans should take [Haskin] up and adopt
him as their own,” said Fenelon Hasbrouck, a Peekskill
Democratic editor who called for his fellow Democrat‟s
resignation from Congress. In White Plains, the Second
Assembly District convention adopted a resolution condemning
Haskin for his “adulterous communion with unscrupulous
Black Republicans, or Bastard Know-Nothings.” In the first
and third assembly districts as well, Democrats met to condemn
Haskin for breaking with the national administration at a time
when the major parties were still in flux. In April 1858,
Sutherland observed that Haskin was “languishing in the loving
embraces of Black Republicanism…he has excited disgust in
the minds of a large proportion of his constituents, who feel
that he has enacted the part of a betrayer of his party.” These
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vitriolic editorials continued throughout the summer and drove
a wedge through the county Democratic Party.90
What particularly incensed Westchester‟s Democratic
establishment was Republican support for Haskin. “I only
mean to make sure that Haskin shall be returned,” Horace
Greeley confided to a friend in the summer of 1858. The
Bedford resident publicly declared his support at the
Republican Congressional Convention, where the Committee
on Resolutions, which he chaired, reported that “Haskin
notably resisted every inducement to give his voice and vote
for the enslavement of Kansas….By thus discharging his
imperative duty as the representative of a free labor
constituency,” he had become an ideological ally with
Republicans, who published his name at the top of their ticket.
“We have only to choose between Mr. Haskin and a full blown
Lecompton Democrat. The election of a Republican is an
impossibility,” the Yonkers Examiner conceded before also
endorsing Haskin. Westchester Republicans had ample political
cover to support a Democrat, for Haskin was now “independent
of administrative requirements and party trammels.” Though
Westchester Republican leaders, especially Greeley, were
motivated by policy considerations to endorse Haskin, electoral
strategy also factored into this momentous decision.
Supporting anti-Administration Democrats, they hoped, would
divide the party and pave the way for a Republican victory in
the 1860 Presidential contest.91
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Consistent with their embrace of anti-Lecompton
Democrats, Republican leaders and editors now refused to
compromise with members of the fledging American Party.
“No fusion should take place whereby the Republican Party
shall sacrifice…its central principle of opposition to slavery,”
Rowe declared, though the local party welcomed nativists who
shared the free labor ideology. Westchester Republicans did
not incorporate into their platform nativist or temperance
policies. After American and Republican Party leaders failed
to unite on strong anti-slavery language at the statewide
nominating conventions, Rowe rationalized that his party stood
“better today because we have not incumbered ourselves with
unsympathizing comrades.” Sutherland, of course, spun this
impasse as a victory for his party. County Know-Nothings, he
editorialized, “regard any sort of connection with Black
Republicanism as political prostitution, and are fast arranging
themselves on the side of the National [pro-Buchanan]
Democracy.” An August declaration by Know-Nothing
Council #32 in Peekskill repudiating Haskin‟s stance on
Lecompton seemed to confirm Sutherland‟s analysis. Though
most Democratic candidates won in the 1858 contest, the local
electorate was sufficiently anti-Lecompton to reward Haskin‟s
independence with a second term in Congress. 92
As Democrats and Republicans took their seats in the
Thirty-Sixth Congress, in the summer and fall of 1859,
sectional discord hurtled towards climax over the slavery
extension issue. Abolitionist John Brown sought to stir up a
slave revolt by raiding a federal garrison in Harper‟s Ferry,
Virginia. Horace Greeley distributed Hinton Helper‟s The
Impending Crisis of the South, in which a southern farmer
argued that slavery blocked economic growth in his section.
And Haskin continued opposing Buchanan‟s Lecompton
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policy, proclaiming that he would “sooner co-operate with that
[Republican] party than with those who have…endeavored to
force a slave State into the Union.” These three events helped
re-orient the parties as sectional organizations, convinced the
South that the North would stop at nothing to destroy slavery,
and, according to Westchester Democrats, threatened the
Union, which they feared “cannot hold together under the
pressure of…Helper and John Brown.”93
The stakes for the 1860 Presidential election had been
set. Edmund Sutherland, editor of the most widely circulated
county paper, astutely predicted that the contest “will reduce
the political elements of the district and County into two
parties.” On the one side, the Democratic Party was paralyzed
regarding slavery: though the Westchester party opposed
extending slavery to the territories, southerners who wanted to
secure those rights dominated the national organization. Fed up
with decades of infighting in county, state, and nation, the
Highland Democrat lamented, “party strife has…assailed the
most sacred compacts of our Union.” On the other side, the
Republican Party stood in favor of abolishing slavery in
western territories and in favor of free labor, which included
Whiggish economic policies such as a protective tariff and
internal improvements. Choosing a new President was,
according to one editor, “the most important crisis through
which the country has been allowed to pass.” At risk was “the
perpetuity of the Union of these States.” 94
No campaign typified Democratic infighting better
than that of 1860. New York Democrats failed to coalesce
around a single candidate for the highest office in the entire
country. In July, the party assembled at Schenectady, about
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twenty miles west of Albany, to nominate a so-called People‟s
Union Ticket of presidential electors pledged against Abraham
Lincoln. They hoped that a composite ticket of electors for
Douglas, Breckinridge, and John Bell, the Constitutional Union
candidate, would prevent Lincoln from securing New York‟s
crucial thirty-five electoral votes. Indeed, had Lincoln lost the
entire South and the Empire State, he would have been left with
145 pledged electors—just seven shy of victory. The election
would then be thrown to the House of Representatives where a
Democrat could have won. Which Democrat was unimportant,
contended Sutherland, for “the defeat of Lincoln is the great
object to be effected.”95
The campaign quickly became ugly, even by
nineteenth-century standards. Westchester Democrats lobbed
racist volleys against Lincoln by suggesting that a Republican
victory would usher in black equality, “dragging [whites] down
to his low and bestial capacity.” Talk of “Black
Republicanism” became commonplace. When it came to
slavery policy, Westchester Democrats ignored the issue and
focused on developing industry, preserving nebulous
“economic rights,” and building a railroad to the Pacific. But
each of these issues was wrapped up in sectional controversy.
Would the transcontinental railroad, for example, pass through
free or slave territory? The Schenectady platform avoided this
key question.96
Republicans adopted a platform demonstrating that
by the end of the 1850s, the ethno-cultural issues that had
broken up the Second Party System had faded into the
background. Though the Yonkers Examiner had supported
New Yorker William H. Seward for the 1860 nomination, the
editor touted Lincoln‟s compelling life story and anti-slavery
credentials after the Illinoisan secured the nomination. Rowe
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rejected black equality but argued that extending slavery to the
territories placed hard-working whites at an economic
disadvantage. Popular sovereignty was not an acceptable
alternative because it was “destructive to law and order” by
frequently degenerating into deadly conflicts brought on by
outside agitators. In fact, Rowe‟s views more closely
paralleled the moderate Lincoln‟s than the radical Seward‟s.
Though his party had never won a major election in
Westchester, Rowe clearly drew the battle lines for the
Presidential contest.97
Lincoln swept the northern states on his way to a
landslide victory. But in Westchester, the
Democratic/Constitutional Union slate bested that of the
Republicans by about 10% of the vote. This rejection of
Republicanism took no Westchesterite by surprise; after all, the
county Democratic Party had won the previous four elections.
Nevertheless, Republicans rejoiced and Democrats sulked.
Westchester Democrats regretted the result, “not so much on
party grounds, as for the continued peace and prosperity of the
country.” The most important question confronting
Westchesterites—and all Americans—in the wake of the first
Republican presidential victory was whether Lincoln should
“attempt by force of arms to coerce [the South] back, and thus
plunge the country into all the horrors of a civil war.” Though
Sutherland hated Lincoln, he nonetheless concluded that the
Union, “which cost our fathers so much toil and sacrifices and
blood to establish,” was worth preserving. On this much, both
parties agreed.98
Yet during the loose party times of the 1850s, the
Democratic Party dominated Westchester County‟s politics.
The candidate at the top of their ticket lost only two elections
during the decade—both to a third party that did not survive
past 1858. Although the Republican Party emerged out of the
chaos of the 1850s as the northern sectional party, Westchester
remained an anomalous bastion of anti-Lincoln voters.
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Proximity to New York City accounted for much of this
sentiment. As Westchester transitioned from rural to
suburban, the county was pulled into the City‟s political orbit.
And City-dwellers, just like their neighbors to the north,
overwhelmingly favored the Democrats.
The local transition from the Second to Third Party
Systems, moreover, produced unique political alignments.
Perhaps no other northern county saw Republicans fuse with
Democrats to counter the Know-Nothings. Three years later,
Westchester Republicans again endorsed an anti-slavery
Democrat for Congress rather than nominate one of their own.
These two fusions demonstrated that Westchesterites voted for
people who shared their ideology instead of consistently
supporting a particular political party. The county‟s
experience with Know-Nothingism also illustrated this
peculiar trend. Whereas most historians view the nativist
party as a stepping-stone from the Whigs to the Republicans,
Westchester Know-Nothings primarily held Democratic
antecedents. When the Know-Nothings disintegrated after the
1858 elections, its supporters, who most ardently embraced
the party‟s ideology, migrated almost entirely back into the
Democratic fold. Fluid party affiliation weakened political
organizations, facilitating the massive realignment of the
1850s.
Ethno-cultural issues bear primary responsibility for
realigning Westchester‟s electorate. Examining issues
affecting everyday life, such as nativism and temperance,
reveals that the Whig Party began unraveling well before the
Kansas-Nebraska Act passed in 1854. The Democratic Party,
too, suffered from fissures generated not by slavery, but by
Erie Canal financing, the Maine Law, and antiparty sentiment.
Slavery may have led to the ultimate extinction of the Second
Party System on the national level, but state and local
campaigns in off-year elections, such as the unusual 1855
contest, profoundly influenced political realignments. KnowNothings elevated ethno-cultural issues to thrive in
Westchester during two non-Presidential elections. This party,
in turn, siphoned voters from the Whigs and Democrats,
challenged the nascent Republican Party, and led to the
Second Party System‟s mortality. It is impossible to tell the
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story of how these four nationally competitive political parties
divided, disintegrated, or formed without considering forces
operating on the county and town levels. Most voters had
closer ties with elected officials at home than with those in
Washington, and thus ethno-cultural and financial issues—the
stuff of local politics—induced voters to flee from the Whig
Party and to change the complexion of the Democratic Party.
Towards the end of the 1850s, however, ethnocultural issues had lost salience. By 1856, slavery consumed
political affairs at all levels of government, filled the editorial
pages of Westchester‟s partisan press, and strengthened the
Republican Party pledged to preserve the principle of free
labor. John Jay, grandson of the first Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, was one of the first Westchesterites to join the
local party. On the eve of the 1860 election, Jay addressed a
meeting of county Republicans in Bedford, down the block
from the Post Office where William Robertson had cast his
ballot in 1848. “It will be wise for the slaveholders, instead of
harping on dissolution, to prepare for the abolition of slavery,”
he suggested, “not by the action of the Republican party, but
by the operation of natural laws, that neither individuals nor
parties can restrain.” Although Jay‟s appeal did not sway his
fellow Westchesterites to support Lincoln in 1860, the “natural
laws” he cited ultimately triumphed over party and sectional
divisions during the Civil War, culminating in emancipation
and Union war victory. During the 1850s, Westchesterites
transcended, blurred, and erased party lines regarding dozens
of issues—most prominently on nativism, temperance, and
slavery. After these ten years of loose party times, they again
subordinated partisanship to principle. When the south
seceded, Westchesterites finally found a universal rallying
point: saving the very Union that gave birth to their political
parties.99
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Westchester County Newspapers: Parties and
Editors
Newspaper

Party

Editor

Eastern State Journal

Democratic (Barnburner, Hard)

Edmund G. Sutherlan

Highland Democrat

Democratic

Fenelon Hasbrouck

Hudson River Chronicle

Whig (Silver Gray)/American

William Howe

Peekskill Republican

Whig (Sewardite)/Republican

J.J. Chambers

Westchester Herald

Democratic (Hunker, Hard)

Caleb Roscoe

Westchester Gazette

Nonpartisan/Temperance

Eugene Hyde; John C

Yonkers Examiner

Republican

M.F. Rowe

Sec. of State)
Governor)

Table 2. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18531854
Whig
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Know-Nothing
39.5
21.7
39.8
-25.8
30.9
5.7
37.6
Table 3. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18541855
Whig
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
1854 (Governor)
25.8
30.9
5.7
1855 (Sec. of State)
-7
32.0

Know3
3

Table 4. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18551856
Republican

Soft Dem.
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Hard Dem.

Know-Nothing

855 (Sec. of State)
856 (President)

22.3
35.3

7.0

32.0
36.4

38.7
28.3

Table 5. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18561857

1856 (President)
1857 (Sec. of State)

Republican
35.3
27.5
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Democratic
36.4
52.6

Know-Noth
28.3
19.9

